All right, let's keep it going. The next speaker for this year in practice
death room is a Jim Freeland and is going to talk about CRA by design, protocol embedded
compliance for EV charging infrastructure. Take it away sir.
Thank you. I hope you can hear me.
Yes, as you see, we keep in the area of electric mobility but we switch a little bit
to bribe its battery electric mobility and as you can see already 2004 and a year ago
Mr. Blato tried to charge his e-dunkey and it didn't work.
The problem here is yeah, EV charging isn't no longer really a nice internet of broken things
topic. It's getting like Deutsche Bahn into the area of critical infrastructure but the
manufacturers are perhaps not yet there.
This talk is more about architecture, not the legal interpretations and it's a little bit
because we are practical gun guys. A mixture of cyber resilience acted in this tool
because both from a technical perspective solve similar problems even when the
regulation is very different. So keep this in mind. I'm not a lawyer here.
Come on. You have noticed the mobility is exploding but it's still the same
all-ship and forgetmentality, security, resilience,
ability, life-saken management, all the ability. It's a little bit better in Germany
because you know Germans like it in a correct way but Germans are also very known for
they do not care about the end user. So this rated a lot of technical depth over the last 15
years of immobility and how can we start to solve that.
One problem is if you're charging is not a very simple domain. Perhaps the most common
news case is when you think you go to a charging station, stand in front of a charging station
you have to display then it's quite simple because you have a broader strategic
element and a user is using it directly. That's fine. That's more or less also in scope
of a cyber resilience act but we're also connecting a gun. Perhaps the sitting in a
car and remote control, the charging station, we are the car. Then the cyber
resilience act is no longer the only thing we have to respect. There are other regulations
we have to do something about it. Normal way would be now we open
axle, create a mapping table between the one regulation and the other regulation
and just be happy with compliance. But again we are not here for compliance.
We are here for architecture and technology. The next thing is we have a problem perhaps
we have a charging station, perhaps we have a long control or because of energy,
crits, crits and so on. But then we go through a long, long, long path of software
and server systems. So they are not regulated in a cyber resilience act. Perhaps
some of them will be in the future regulated and then this too. We have some strange
definition in the cyber resilience act, the foreseeable use and the foreseeable use
obviously they are included in this path. So at the moment we do not know how we
really have to solve this problem. We will see in the future if those entities which are
soft as a service will be somehow regulated or if a manufacturer can say something
about the minimum requirements of these entities in the middle. But at the moment we
do not know. So very a lot of other nice regulations. Everybody knows we use
everybody cuts for authentication and charging station. They do not provide any kind of
security. We have other strange things like make addresses of the car, which you know
is even worse than everybody. We have a German calibration law, as I said, a wonderful
regulation. We have digital signatures on measurement values. But how the user should use
it and how the user even gets them. That is not part of this regulation. So it is not
working. If ISO 15, 118, which is talking about cryptography and so on and so on, but
it is just the first meter. It is just on the charging cable. And we have a very
equipment and it is active since laws are always and we see we only I should not cross
this line. And we see what the manufacturers are really doing is they do not
encrypt security. They remove features that operate as depend on because they are going
now. It is not secure and long I can use this. But for example, when you want to read
your own diagnostics look files, you can download it from the device. It will be encrypted
and you can send it to us via email. We send you the look files back via email. I do
not know if this is really a solution to a security problem. But this is what happens
in the market today. So I would say a red was also failed. Once back,
straight up, you will know it already. Security compliance is not trust. And the intent
to improve security, but with a solution which lowers security like this, we send you
a diagnostic information via email as not perhaps the evidence that we really produce
more security. And as you know, once it is standard or specification is out, it
occupies very fast and you have very hard time to improve something. So we want to use
both regulations as design inputs and go away from security and it is just as best
effort and happens. Perhaps when a manufacturer has a good day on a better way, do not
have much real security. So for engineers, what does this mean? We have now to think a
little bit, what must be enabled or disabled by default for this charging station? What
kind of data or information must be observable? What must be proveable in years later?
You know, when we talk about charging stations, we have payments and we have regulations
far away from technology that say when you have a business process, you have to provide evidence,
store on this evidence, improve it even years later. That is not where E.B.
charging is currently. But also, the uncomfortable tools for regulators is, in
immobility, we have not the simple relationship between the manufacturer and the user. A user
is very often operating more than one device, from more than one manufacturer.
More than one firm there, version. So interoperability is a key factor in this area.
We have the same product type, with product type, I mean now charging stations from different
manufacturers and how do we model it that they are somehow interoperable.
Because inconsistency of deployments and inconsistency of compatibility or interoperability
may also increase our systematic risks, which are important under this tool for the entire
system or even for the product itself. For the charging station itself, when we look at
cyber miscellaneous act. Luckily, since 15 years, the existing organization is called Open
Charge Alliance, they produce a protocol. It is open. It is not like the typical easels
standards. It is really as real like it. As engineers, it is really as open as E.B.F.
E racist. But it comes from another direction. It is a management protocol, how to talk
to the charging station. So, the first user of the charging station is more or less the operator.
The protocol encodes some kian and some tune syntax behavior and error semantics and so on,
what you imagine. And defaults matter of course more than options, but we also see a lot of
vendor hex because obviously when we try to discuss this, come to come and ground, this takes
always a lot of time. And vendors have always some time pressure to get something on the market.
There's also a logic because, as I said, open judge online is only in the first step,
so the direct connection to the traffic station, there's a project,
by NG0, it's called EV quality infrastructure. You can go to building k and get some stickers
for this project. It's basically extending OCPP on the other entities, which you have seen
between the traffic station and the end user, so all the middle man, which are required for EV rooming.
So, technical specifications break under regulation. We have the same protocol, but too many
rules, the same protocol, but different acceptable risks. Why? Because charging station,
you know charging station can be at home. At home, you have an operational environment,
which is perhaps not that complex, but you can also have charging stations in the streets,
and they are regulated under this too, because they are now critical infrastructure, high power
charging stations. So, you have a wide variety of operational environments, and therefore,
very different acceptable risks, and you have a very different operational environment,
because you can imagine working behind their footsteps, it's very different to
we are working behind a professional operator network at a big charging station operator.
Therefore, we came to already a year ago, we started discussing the cyber resilience
act in the open church alliance. We came to the conclusion, we have to split the protocol
specification into a technical layer, which gives us just the information, the bits, and bytes,
like, yes, we use TLS, yes, we don't use very broken either levels of TLS, but we do not
over specify how we should use TLS, for example, because we have seen in 1511H, this is very awful,
when you over specify something, and then you have an operability problem between the different
versions of the same protocol, and your car is again not charging, because the charging station
expects TLS 1.3, and you only can talk TLS 1.2, and it's explicitly forbidden to be downward
compatible. So, we created this separation, we have a technical layer, we have a secure specification,
and the security operation skyds is meant specific for every operational environment,
which tells me, okay, when you are charging station, you are at home indoors,
let's totally nice, because you have an easy life. When you are at home outdoors,
it's already getting a little bit complicated, because now you have no physical accessibility anymore,
then you have to implement something, perhaps differently, or enable some options in a different way.
This allows also security and resilience to involve, because what we really, really want to avoid
is that we soon have a TLS version 1.4, and again nothing is working, because the
ISO standards defined we have to use TLS 1.3. That's not really helpful, and it's also,
from my point of view, for us, kind of, security. So, we come up from this, what we see, perhaps,
in this cyber-resignance activity, it's very simple, architecture to a much more complex
architecture, it's different manufacturers, they have different products, and we split,
now our protocol in more or less, free layers. This idea is also supported by cyber-stand,
but, well, working for cyber-stand is not as easy as I thought in the first place,
but you will get some nice deliverables. The next thing is, as I said, open charter lines already
exist in the protocol exist in 15 years, open charter lines exist in 11 years, so more or less,
everywhere in the market we already have this kind of software stewards, or voluntary secure
attestation frameworks, cyber-insignance actors speaking of, so we have some organization in the
middle, who already defines, implements some parts of our obligations of the cyber-insignance
act, and on the other side of the interface could provide us some guarantees, because open
charge protocol defines an testing tool, wouldn't it be nice if the outcome of a testing tool
would already give us the assumption of conformity, perhaps, 50 percent of it,
because then also the open charter lines has a much better standing, because it's a really
solving problems for the people, even for the regulations, not only for interoperability,
this was the first part, then the next technical issue is cyber-insignance acting,
this two are currently living outside of our protocol's text, so when we consume a service,
which might be produced by a product, or it's a software service service,
we usually start at the end of that working layer, my preferred example on the time service of
the German PTB, Deutsche Physikalisch technische Bundesanstalt, they produce legal time in Germany,
so charging stations have to consume these legal time, but in an end effect, they just
give you four URLs, here please speak NTP to us, of course we can now switch from a normal
NTP to network time secure, and everything is a bit more secure, but our resignance is not yet solved,
it's just authentic time, but nothing more, wouldn't it be nice if you have, okay thank you,
wouldn't it be nice if we have some layer on top of this, where we can say okay,
not only give you the information on this range website that we have for service, and perhaps
it's version of the NTS protocol to speak to us, could we create some layer 8, I call it,
where we define the governance of this service, so that we like plateau with this theory of forms
of German IDN layer, describe in an abstract way, yes we provide the time service, we give you
all the other metadata, like the typical DNS records for services or the more modern version of services,
data for cryptographic key management, and service descriptions, contact information,
all the stuff you know from the cyber design and equity should provide, you get this in a
chasen, you get this, we are well known URL, this pattern is often not an invention of us, this
well known URLs, defined in a couple of overseas, and we create a new bus word for all the people
who love bus words of a digital service passport, which is directly related to the digital
product passport, we have on the other side with the regulations for products, there we have the
same we consume this service, for example a touchy situation consumes the time service now,
meaning it no longer addresses for service, it addresses this chasen document and gets all the
information it needs from the structure manual, the endpoints, but also what about the quality of the
time, what are the delay differences between the responses, so that I can still can say this is
legal time, not the one, so as we have seen cyber designs, active vices shall expose some of
those their information, they have bit other information as you know already from cyber
residence active, also vulnerability information but also, especially firmware update information,
and in the end this enables a much more efficient error reports as all contexts information
is directly available because what you really know when you have to operate devices,
when something is not working you get an email with the word, it's not working, but nothing more,
wouldn't it be nice if the device could add automatically on this context information and then the
email, not via email to catch all, but to specify it URL and so we come to the conclusions,
first open source protocols, not only open source software projects,
should from all point of view become cyber-resignant experts, please split your protocol and
attack me kill base layer in the security operations guide, provides governance metadata of
all your services and products, we are what I call now platons layer, and consume the governance
metadata to improve all your ongoing processes within your company, because support requests are
really a help when you don't have the right context information, so now platon is happy,
that's it, thanks.